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I. DISTRUSTING TRUST
Public distrust erodes the efficiency and productivity of our economy,
government, and society. It accelerates and amplifies weaknesses in our
democratic political infrastructure alongside business relationships and social
interactions in mutually reinforcing ways. Determining how to cultivate
public trust depends on definitions of “the public”: to whom the government
and its officials are accountable. Given the history of the United States as a
White settler colonial state, its dependence on African chattel slavery, and its
continuing racist xenophobia, “the public” is a frustratingly elastic term. For
marginalized populations, public trust might vary in intensity over the past
centuries since the nation's founding. In analyses and assessments of levels
of trust in the strength or fragility of public institutions, Black, Indigenous and
people of color (“BIPOC”) have often been excluded from the polls and
surveys upon which public opinion or sentiment is based. A lack of public
trust in government significantly impacts determinations of constitutional rot
and renewal; however, in the absence of BIPOC responses and inclusion in
“the public” over the centuries of U.S. history, constitutional rot for
marginalized populations has been an ongoing emergency in their continual
lack of or restricted access to constitutional rights and protections. This
perpetual constitutional rot is far from an unusual condition.
Policymakers and pundits look to influential surveys to assess levels of
trust. From 1964 to 1980, public trust in federal government fell fifty
percentage points, from seventy-seven to twenty-seven percent.1 With peaks
of forty-four percent in 1983 and fifty-four percent in 2002, public trust has
languished well under fifty percent since 1980. Public trust dropped to its
lowest, fifteen percent, in 2010 and has hovered between fifteen and twenty
percent since.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) identifies the compounding drawbacks of public
distrust: “A decline in trust can lead to lower rates of compliance with rules
and regulations. Citizens and businesses can also become more risk-averse,
delaying investment, innovation and employment decisions that are essential
to regain competitiveness and jumpstart growth.”2 The lack of public trust
has long-term costs that undermine the legitimacy of the rule of law and the
government that creates and enforces it.

1. Lee Rainie et al., Trust and Distrust in America, Pew Res. Ctr.: U.S. Policy &
Politics (Jul. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/07/22/trust-anddistrust-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/CL9N-QVWK]; Public Trust in Government:
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Apr.
11,
2019),
1958-2019,
PEW
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-19582019/ [https://perma.cc/UD6T-67J6].
2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereinafter
“OECD”], Government at a Glance 2013 20 (2013), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2013_gov_glance-2013-en
[https://perma.cc/A79F-9CAL]; Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, supra note
1.
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Trust can be defined as “positive perception” or “confidence” in the
actions of individuals or institutions.3 It is a necessary precondition for
cooperation – which philosopher Diego Gambetta defines as the “abstention
from mutual injury”4 – and which undergirds the most basic interactions of
daily life: “from marriage to economic development, from buying a secondhand car to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the
continuation of life on earth.”5
Trust is often perceived as the oil that greases the wheels of our
foundational institutions; distrust can disrupt the smooth functioning of these
systems. In his 2019 book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Jack M. Balkin
identifies how our political system functions in three primary cycles: of
regimes, polarization, and constitutional rot and renewal.6 All three cycles
depend on public trust and themselves produce increases or decreases in trust
at various points in the cycle.7 These cycles are useful typologies of decline
and recovery, and Balkin’s discussion serves as an exhortation for readers of
one political moment to move from one stage of a regime to a better one, from
polarization to depolarization and from rot to renewal. The difficulty of
analysis, of definitively apprising where we are in the cycles – whether on our
way down or poised upward – stems from trust functioning simultaneously as
an indicator, cause, or outcome. Trust might indicate a future trajectory, push
us toward renewal or rot, or result from where we are in the cycle,
respectively. In this Article, I focus on the third cycle of constitutional rot and
renewal in order to evaluate the general assumption that political compromise
could foster more trust, and that more trust would lead to more cooperation.
In positing the notion of constitutional rot, Balkin argues that we can
evaluate the “failures” or weakening of democracy and republicanism: a
decrease or lack of “responsiveness to public opinion and public will” and
“public officials’ devotion to the public good.”8 Balkin details further
essential criteria of rot in the political system:
When public servants are increasingly diverted into the pursuit of their
own wealth, or when they are increasingly diverted into serving the
interests of a relatively small number of very powerful individuals,
democracy and republicanism decay, and we have constitutional rot.
And when public officials are no longer responsive either to public will
or to the public good, and instead serve the interests of a small group

3. OECD, supra note 2, at 21; Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, supra
note 1.
4. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust? in MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 215 (1988).
5. Diego Gambetta, Foreword, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS ix, ix–x (Diego Gambetta ed. 1988).
6. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 6 (2020)
7. Id. at 46–49.
8. Id. at 45.
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of powerful and wealthy people, the result is oligarchy – rule by the
few.9

The first two decades of the twenty-first century easily illustrate some of these
warnings. Economic inequality has skyrocketed in the aftermath of the 2007–
09 Great Recession and deepened during the COVID-19 lockdowns despite a
global Occupy movement and some reforms and regulations in response to
the global financial crisis.10 The police murders of, and brutality against,
Black people have garnered more national and international media attention
over the safety of Blacks in the privacy of their own homes or out in public.11
Vote denial and dilution has contracted and attenuated the power of voters
through gerrymandering, voter intimidation, lax voting rights enforcement,
and restrictive voter identification laws; the dismantling of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder was the most prominent federal
example.12
In campaign finance deregulation, Citizens United v.
FEC greenlighted the creation of “super PACs” with opaque donor lists and
unlimited corporate general fund donations, and McCutcheon v.
FEC removed the biennial aggregate spending cap for individual donors and
allowed unlimited aggregate donations – although contributions to any

9. Id.
10. See Greg Iacurci, The Legacy of 2020: Riches for the wealthy, well educated
and often White, financial pain for others (Jan. 1, 2021, 9:05 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/01/the-covid-recession-brought-extreme-inequalityin-2020.html [https://perma.cc/R3JE-YC6F]; Juliana Menasce Horowitz et. al, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-and-wealthinequality/ [https://perma.cc/3Y6A-KNWP]; Ray Sanchez, CNN, Occupy Wall
Street:
5
Years
Later
(Sept.
16,
2016,
3:50
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/us/occupy-wall-street-protestmovements/index.html [https://perma.cc/R473-BHVE].
11. Jorge L. Ortiz, ‘It’s Nothing but Pain’: The Latest on the Cases of Violence
against Black People that Sparked America’s Racial Reckoning, USA TODAY (Sept.
9, 2020, 9:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/09/georgefloyd-breonna-taylor-jacob-blake-what-we-know/5753696002/
[https://perma.cc/C847-SEZQ]; Khaleda Rahman, From George Floyd to Breonna
Taylor, Remembering the Black People Killed by Police in 2020, NEWSWEEK (Dec.
29, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/george-floyd-breonna-taylorblack-people-police-killed-1556285 [https://perma.cc/4VZ8-E9KB]; Oge Egbuonu,
Breonna Taylor and George Floyd both Deserve Justice. But Justice for Black Women
is
Elusive,
NBC
NEWS
(June
26,
2020,
11:54
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/breonna-taylor-george-floyd-both-deservejustice-justice-black-women-ncna1232190 [https://perma.cc/WS8G-T9ZK].
12. 507 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (holding §4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 unconstitutional); see Lynn M. Itagaki, The Racial Laundering of Equality after
Shelby County v. Holder, in THE SHADOW OF SELMA 264–88 (Henry K. Lozano & Joe
Street, eds. 2018).
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individual candidate were still capped, an individual donor could contribute
up to the maximum amount to unlimited candidates.13
In The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Balkin identifies two further
dimensions of constitutional rot and renewal that impede or facilitate
government: levels of cooperation and trust in institutions. Constitutional rot
and renewal rests on the choices of public officials and fellow citizens to
uphold “political norms of mutual forbearance and fair political competition
that make it possible for people who disagree with each other to jointly pursue
the public good.”14 Legal and political systems, however elaborate and
sophisticated, cannot incentivize all behaviors to engage in effective
governance: “Republics depend on more than mere obedience to the letter of
the law. They depend on well-functioning institutions that balance and check
power and ambition, and conventions that require government officials to
behave in a public-spirited fashion.”15
Given the repeated emphasis on the public good, public opinion, and
public will, the notion of the public obviously plays a crucial role in public
trust. The problem of public trust is that the term “public” has not referred to
the same constituency since the first voting cycle of the new republic, and the
opinions and preferences of those excluded are ignored. “The public” is
constituted legally and politically as a grouping of citizens and eligible voters,
and government officials and policymakers are perceived most accountable to
this public. Although in everyday conversations we might refer to “the
public” and U.S. eligible voters as if these terms always included all citizens,
say over eighteen years old, the “public” of public opinion, public will, and
public good has shifted along with the expansion and contraction of the
franchise. And despite an implicitly anachronistic, stable assumption of a
continuous body politic – that people who are citizens and voters today would
have been eligible for citizenship, naturalization, or the franchise in the past –
elected officials and policymakers of the day are thought to be held most
accountable to their current constituents and voters since those people can
vote to keep them in or kick them out of office. However, the vagaries of
campaign finance and electoral politics have vaulted mega-donors to the
forefront,16 which has further contracted the notion of the “public” to whom
13. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010)
(holding inter alia that the government may not suppress political speech based on
corporate identity and could not limit corporate independent expenditures);
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192–93 (2014) (holding that
aggregate limits on campaign expenditures violated the First Amendment); Lynn M.
Itagaki, United States, Inc.—Citizens United and the Shareholder Citizen, KALFOU,
Fall 2014, at 114, 114–136.
14. BALKIN supra note 6, at 45.
15. Id.
16. David Callahan & J. Mijin Cha, Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of
Politics by the Affluent & Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America
(February
2013).
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/StackedDeck_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8R4-JCE8].
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government is accountable. The public to whom the judiciary is accountable
has also changed as judges and justices are more often noticed by elected
officials through ideological and political networks of think tanks and elite
donors and write their opinions for such audiences.17
When we claim we are for the public good, are we implicitly defining
the public as constituted of likeminded people with similar political interests
and goals? In other words, not only is the notion of the public good widely
varying but so is the notion of the public itself. Considering the eighteenthcentury Anglo-American historical context of traditional liberalism, political
theorist Wendy Brown points out that liberalism’s fundamental unit is the
family, but not all of its persons were members of the public and enfranchised
citizens.18 White Christian straight male property owners, as heads of
households, possessed not only land, buildings, equipment, tools, and
furniture, but also people: wives, children, and enslaved persons.19 In the first
decades of the new republic, a much smaller community of White propertied
men constituted eligible voters and were the public to which policymakers
were accountable and elected officials beholden.20 Even as the notion of the
public has expanded (and variously contracted) to include these
unenfranchised members of the household and those segregated or excluded
as “a race so different,”21 for example, and the two Americas of rich and poor,
of White and BIPOC, map onto the franchised and the disenfranchised: the
citizen and the noncitizen are unevenly incorporated with varying influence
into “the public.”
For almost two centuries of formal BIPOC
disenfranchisement, American democracy was one of continual constitutional
rot and crisis that might arguably persist into the present day.22 Lack of
17. BALKIN supra note 6, at 120–21.
18. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 150–51 (1995).
19. Id. at 149.
20. Despite the 1790 Naturalization Act that had property requirements for
becoming a United States citizen in addition to gender and racial ones, some states
allowed women who owned property and free African Americans to vote. The exact
number is difficult to assess but hovers around eighteen percent of the adult population
(including women and African Americans who could or could not vote depending on
the state) or twenty percent of the total White population (including women who could
or could not vote depending on the state and minors). See generally, Dave Umhoefer,
Mark Pocan says less than 25 percent of population could vote when Constitution was
written”
POLITIFACT
(Apr.
16,
2015),
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2015/apr/16/mark-pocan/mark-pocan-saysless-25-percent-population-could-v/
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Harlan
was referring to Chinese immigrants who were accorded some White privileges of
riding in first-class train cars when Black citizens were denied; the majority opinion
in this case established the “separate but equal” doctrine).
22. LYNN MIE ITAGAKI, CIVIL RACISM: THE 1992 LOS ANGELES REBELLION AND
THE CRISIS OF RACIAL BURNOUT 19–22 (2016) (defining crisis in relation to interracial
conflict).
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political will, enforcement, and accountability has produced a hierarchy of
citizenship that reinforces ideological, racial, and religious hierarchies. Under
polarization, party membership resuscitates old and creates new forms of
inclusion and exclusion in the concept of the “the public”: Democrats are unAmerican for being anti-capitalists, socialists, and communists; Republicans
are anti-democratic for supporting authoritarianism, warmongering, and
oligarchic capitalism.
In The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Balkin is directly responding to
the Trump Administration and the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global
economic crisis, Tea Party movement, Movement for Black Lives, and
landmark Supreme Court decisions striking down or invalidating legislative
voting protections, such as the Voting Rights Act.23 However, the situation
of constitutional rot seems to be much more longstanding and pervasive than
the four or eight years of any presidential administration as Balkin readily
recognizes. Given the above definition of constitutional rot that privileges the
“interests of a small group of powerful and wealthy people,” the founding
documents of our nation themselves – the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights – are deeply rooted in constitutional rot and
constitutional crisis.24 Centuries-long “slow violences”25 of second-class
citizenship and designations of sub-humanity have allowed crimes against
humanity, pain, suffering, and inequity to go unrecognized and unredressed,
and these harms continue to haunt descendants and survivors into the present:
land theft and genocide of Indigenous peoples, enslavement of African
peoples, and xenophobic terror and harassment. Constitutional crisis, rot, and
renewal is experienced unevenly, often vastly so.
I want to dwell further on this long history of contradictions. Balkin
himself admits this situation:
Constitutional rot is a relative term, like being tall or short. It denotes
a period of backsliding in democratic and republican norms and
institutions, after a period of increasing democratization, or, at least,
relative stability. This caveat is important because the United States
has never been fully democratic or republican . . . When I say that
constitutional rot is the gradual loss of democracy and republicanism,

23. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 3, 8.
24. Id. at 45.
25. Nixon defines slow violence as “a violence that occurs gradually and out of
sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an
attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is
customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and
spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I
believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular
nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions
playing out across a range of temporal scales.” ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE
ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 2 (2011).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 10

548

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

therefore, I am speaking of a relative decline from an already imperfect
system.26

In this Article, I consider how this “imperfect system” is deliberately and
intentionally created and maintained.
In fact, the democracy for some has been cultivated and enshrined amid
authoritarianism for everyone else. Political scientist Howard Winant has
called the United States a racial dictatorship and, with sociologist Michael
Omi in their classic study, Racial Formation in the United States, also a form
of racial despotism that lasted until the end of Jim Crow segregation in the
1960s and 1970s.27 Thus, the protection and strengthening of White interests
are seen by their proponents and beneficiaries as constitutional renewal, not
rot. History reminds us that Southern Democrats called themselves the
“redeemers,” promoting the so-called “Redemption” after the end of
Reconstruction and the end of federal protection of Black rights.28 These stark
terms of dictatorship and despotism force a nation with a foundational myth
of democratic republicanism to reckon with its corollary failures: freedom for
some and second-class citizenship, enslavement, dispossession, exclusion,
and genocide for the rest.
Indeed, one person’s constitutional rot is another’s renewal. One
person’s harbingers of rot are another’s signs of renewal. Determinations of
constitutional rot or renewal are not objective facts, especially when given the
deep and enduring polarization and marginalization of certain segments of the
polity. The contraction of democracy and exclusion of people from the rights
and protections of full citizens can be seen, as it was after 1877, as renewal or
“redemption.” This conflict over which persons are allowed entry into “the
public” is a struggle over who experiences constitutional rot, renewal, or crisis
at each juncture. I posit that the notion of one’s rot and another’s renewal can
be identified through cycles of the strengthening and weakening of what
historian Gary Gerstle has termed civic nationalism and racial nationalism.29
Civic nationalism is a secular trust in
the transformative power of the United States not in God but in the
nation’s core political ideals, in the American belief in the fundamental
equality of all human beings, in every individual’s inalienable rights

26. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 45.
27. For “racial dictatorship,” see HOWARD WINANT, THE NEW POLITICS OF
RACE: GLOBALISM, DIFFERENCE, JUSTICE 205 (University of Minnesota Press
2004). For “racial despotism,” see generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2014).
28. See generally, ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND
ITS LEGACY 39–73 (2007); James T. Moore, Redeemers Reconsidered: Change and
Continuity in the Democratic South, 1870-1900, 44 J. OF S. HIST. 357, 357 (1978).
29. GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 3–11 (2001).
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to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and in a democratic
government that derives its legitimacy from the people’s consent.30

An integral part of the American Dream, these tenets of civic nationalism form
the cornerstone of American exceptionalism, the American way, and the
American Creed – this last concept what Gunnar Myrdal conceived of as
driving political faith and public trust in the moral principles of U.S.
governance.31 Moreover, these democratic founding principles are portable
and can develop anywhere.
When branches of government curtail voting rights or blatantly fail to
enforce and uphold the full rights and protections of all citizens, and when the
public appears to support these actions, civic nationalism falters, and this
failure often signals the rise of racial nationalism. The end of Reconstruction
exemplifies this weakening of civic nationalism and strengthening of racial
nationalism:
Throughout its history, however, American civic nationalism has
contended with another potent ideological inheritance, a racial
nationalism that conceives of America in ethnoracial terms, as a people
held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherited
fitness or self-government. This ideal, too, was inscribed in the
Constitution (although not in the Declaration of Independence), which
endorsed the enslavement of Africans in the southern states, and it was
encoded in a key 1790 law limiting naturalization to “free white
persons.”32

In more recent critical debates, racial nationalism is the prerogative of
White Christian settler colonialism, a political eugenics of democratic
expression. It is colloquially expressed as “White is right” and that justice is
“just us” for Whites, as poet and scholar Claudia Rankine’s collection of
essays, Just Us: An American Conversation, has discussed.33 The competing
notions of freedom offered by civic nationalism and racial nationalism are the
political calculus for most policy issues. The former can and often has led to
an expansion of those who are afforded the rights and protections of full
citizens and strengthened those rights and protections by facilitating the
accountability of those in power to newly franchised stakeholders. Racial
nationalism can and often has led to the contraction of those who can claim
citizenship, residence, and the rights and protections provided by government.
Constitutional instruments are often unenforced for marginalized groups who
are dehumanized to legitimize their victimization, and this lack of

30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.; see generally, GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA; THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
32. GERSTLE, supra note 28, at 4.
33. CLAUDIA RANKINE, JUST US: AN AMERICAN CONVERSATION (2020).
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enforcement excludes them from being claims-bearing complainants to whom
governments and “the public” are accountable.

II. COMPROMISE, CONSENSUS, COMMON GROUND
Although compromise is a useful political strategy and necessary for
human relations, the much-heralded political compromises of the first century
of United States history all involved the continued existence of White
supremacy and racial despotism through labor and personhood stolen from
enslaved Africans on land stolen from Indigenous peoples. Known through
popular history as such, the allegedly great compromises of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries underwrote the expansion of slavery through the death
and displacement of Indigenous populations, whether the Three-Fifths
Compromise that brought slave states to support the Constitution or the
Compromise of 1850 that tried to preserve the Union.
How does trust function in these political negotiations? From popular
belief to scholarly treatises, trust is most often manifested in cooperation and
mutually beneficial relationships. Most people will generally advocate for
political leaders to seek compromise, cooperation, common ground, and even
consensus. They usually extoll these virtues in their everyday, interpersonal
situations. Strong trust builds social cohesion which “increase[s] the
efficiency and effectiveness of government operations” and allows
governments “to act without having to resort to coercion.”34
Political polarization threatens this cooperation and the trust it fosters.
Despite these high levels of polarization, however, the Pew Research Center
found a consensus across both parties in nine of the top ten issues facing
Americans and overwhelming agreement for “keeping the country safe from
terrorism (91%), responding to natural disasters (87%) and ensuring safe food
and medicine (87%).”35 A majority of self-identified Democrats and
Republicans agreed that “government should play a major role” in six other
issues relating to the economy, environment, immigration, infrastructure,
poverty, and public health.36 In only one of the ten issues did a minority of
Republicans (42 percent) in contrast to a vast majority of Democrats (85
percent) favor the government playing a major role in “ensuring access to
healthcare”37 – recording the highest difference between parties at 43 percent.
The next two issues with the most variance between party-affiliated
respondents showed a slim majority of Republicans believing the government
should play a large part in “protecting the environment” (52 percent) and

34. OECD, supra note 2, at 21.
35. Americans’ View of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive
Performance Ratings, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/09/14/americans-views-of-governmentlow-trust-but-some-positive-performance-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/U2P4-AJY2].
36. Id.
37. Id.
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“helping people get out of poverty” (50 percent) whereas Democrats were 90
percent and 74 percent, respectively.38
In more alarming results regarding compromise and common ground,
the Georgetown Institute of Politics and Public Service Battleground Poll in
April and October 2019 added a few statements related to civility for
respondents to agree or disagree with, such as the “political, racial, and class
divisions in this country are getting worse and our national dialogue is
breaking down,” or “I am frustrated by the uncivil and rude behavior of many
politicians.”39 With percentages between 77 to 83 for the former and 88 to 90
percent for the latter, respondents clearly signaled their beliefs that politicians,
pundits, and the public were divided, unable to dialogue, and uncivil. In
response to the statement, “Compromise and common ground should be the
goal for political leaders,” an overwhelming majority – 85 percent in April
and 87 percent in October – agreed.40 Pew’s mid-2020 survey on public trust
in federal government also revealed that most respondents “say that
Americans can solve problems” and wanted the federal government to
continue working on a variety of issues.41 Implicitly, these relatively stable
majorities demonstrate a trust in the federal government’s capacity for
improving people’s lives. To act on these findings still requires political
compromise and cooperation, which often depend on mutual trust.
Of these terms promoting agreement and mutuality, compromise is one
of the most complex. Beyond the notion of consensus as general agreement,
compromise is reached through concessions made by all parties. Admittedly,
compromise has negative connotations: it can signal “the acceptance of
standards that are lower than is desirable.”42 And, the related adjectives
“compromising” or “compromised” can mean shameful as well as a
discredited position and weakened status.
Cooperation and trust, like dissension and distrust, are strategies that are
not always the most effective depending on the circumstances. Diego
Gambetta trenchantly asks, “Can we trust trust?”43 He points out that
cooperation and trust are not uniformly desirable in all situations.44 In
economic and political contexts, a healthy and productive competition
38. Id.
39. October 2019 Civility Poll, GEORGETOWN UNIV. INST. OF POLITICS AND PUB.
SERV. (Oct. 2019), https://politics.georgetown.edu/battleground-poll/october-2019/
[https://perma.cc/8T96-EXC3]
(see
“Graphics
and
Slides”
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ucvkLBbDkV31UjkXHcnty3ftWz2fb0Dy/view).
This poll is run semi-annually by the Institute of Politics at Georgetown University
with Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning polling outfits.
40. Id.
41. Americans’ View of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive
Performance Ratings, supra note 34.
42.
Compromise,
LEXICO
(last
visited
Mar.
15,
2021),
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/compromise [https://perma.cc/8DRX-WG6Y].
43. Gambetta, supra note 4, at 213.
44. Id. at 215.
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“enriching the human lot” might be warranted before cooperation, although
this effective competition might depend on trust in one’s competitors and the
perception of mutual benefits.45 One side might actively thwart cooperation
and trust in those on the other side: for example, among a nation’s enemies,
however identified. Propaganda, disinformation, agent provocateurs, and
other strategies of psychological warfare have been used to foment dissension
and distrust among perceived enemies of the state, whether foreign nations or
domestic organizations. On a personal level, abuse, gaslighting, and other
forms of manipulation work to foster distrust in a victim’s own cognition.
Compromise, as a political strategy, necessitates trust and cooperation
after or even before a period of competition in laying the ground rules, as in
international trade agreements. Compromise cultivates and indicates trust in
the system. Here, I return to another important exhortation in Balkin’s
definition of constitutional rot: the cohesion of “the public” supporting the
republic depends “on mutual toleration and forbearance that makes it possible
for contending sides to view each other not as implacable enemies that must
be eliminated but as fellow citizens who, despite their differences, all aim at
the larger goal of serving the res publica.”46 What happens when a republic
incorporates people who have been historically perceived as implacable
enemies? Racial nationalism identifies nonwhite, often non-Christian and
non-European citizens and immigrants as these implacable enemies, and this
flexible, catch-all category of threat to the American way of life and American
institutions is useful for racist appeals and demagoguery.
Specifically, the famed compromises throughout U.S. history that have
ostensibly “healed the Union” have reunited White ruling factions to protect
White interests: (1) the Three-Fifths Compromise that constitutionally
cemented the electoral representation of enslaved persons but not their
freedom nor franchise;47 (2) the antebellum compromises that balanced
“slave” and “free” states’ entry into the Union;48 and (3) the Compromise of
1877 that guaranteed states’ autonomy to disenfranchise and terrorize their
unenslaved people.49 These compromises have reinforced the continued
45. Id. at 5.
46. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 45.
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons… three fifths of all other Persons.”) (emphasis added).
48. See Missouri Compromise, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last visited Jan. 31,
2021), https://www.britannica.com/event/Missouri-Compromise (discussing the
extension of slavery through the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the Kansas-Nebraska
Act of 1854, and the Compromise of 1850).
49. See Michael L. Benedict, Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876-1877: A
Reconsideration of Reunion and Reaction, 46 J. OF S. HIST. 489, 489–90 (1980) (“In
return for southern Democratic support at his inauguration, [President] Hayes agreed
to end the interference in southern states that was no irrelevant to northern Republican
industrial interests.”). I use Patricia J. Williams’ term “unenslaved” to recognize the
varying states of unfreedom experienced by Black people after their ostensible
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dominance of White supremacy. White power elites have reaffirmed and
consolidated the prerogatives of Whites by the expulsion and rejection of the
rights and privileges of nonwhites, a category that has also included Jews,
Muslims, Irish, and southern and eastern Europeans, in addition to African
enslaved persons, Indigenous peoples, or Asian aliens ineligible for
citizenship. Compromise has been achieved through the exploitation of the
physical bodies and legal personhood of the most historically vulnerable or
those most often excluded. Mutuality and cooperation often effectuate the
continued power of White supremacy in U.S. politics, society, economics, and
culture. In fact, compromise that reestablishes trust has often restricted the
very notion of who can belong to the public itself and furthered exclusion.
Consensus has often been achieved through normalizing the violence of White
supremacy and redefining the public good as resources primarily allocated to
Whites. The promise of White superiority produces trust repeatedly
throughout U.S. history.

III. CONCLUSION
In the decades following Reconstruction, local, state, and federal
governments refused to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
and racial terror increased at this “nadir” of United States history.50 Leading
Black intellectuals founded The Crisis, the official journal of the NAACP in
November 1910.51 Writing for the editorial page, W.E.B. Du Bois marked the
journal’s establishment during a “critical time in the history of the
advancement of men,” and The Crisis editorials would “stand for the rights
of men, irrespective of color or race, for the highest ideals of American
democracy, and for [the] reasonable but earnest and persistent attempt to gain
these rights and realize these ideals.”52 His words resonate now, as some
populations have been forced to continually negotiate constitutional crises
over their civil and human rights since the moment of the Constitution’s
crafting and ratification. While this crisis has waxed and waned in intensity,
it has been a crisis for much longer than the first shots fired on Fort Sumter
and the agreement at Appomattox.53

emancipation in 1863. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 4,
143–47 (1992).
50. RAYFORD LOGAN, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir,
1877–1901 (1954).
51. HOME, THE CRISIS, https://www.thecrisismagazine.com/
[https://perma.cc/4ZWG-S9R3]; The Crisis, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last
visited Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Crisis-Americanmagazine [https://perma.cc/DN7U-MSZC].
52. W.E.B. Du Bois, Editorial, THE CRISIS, Nov. 1910, at 10.
53. See Who First Fired at Sumter, DAILY GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1882, at 4 (“At 4:30
a.m. [April 12, 1861] the first gun was fired at Fort Sumter”); The Surrender Meeting,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.
(last
visited
Jan.
31,
2021),
https://www.nps.gov/apco/learn/historyculture/the-surrender-meeting.htm
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Public trust has proven a crucial factor in turning the cycles of
constitutional time and amplifying the cyclical highs and lows of rot and
renewal. A strategy of compromise that increases trust through mutual
cooperation is often implicitly advocated to smooth over polarization or begin
a constitutional renewal. However, the most pivotal compromises in U.S.
history were made among political elites who represented wealthy White
interests and who made decisions about the lives of people who were
disenfranchised, dispossessed, and enslaved, and these marginalized people
had interests of their own that were scarcely represented and mostly
countermanded. While advocating for renewed trust through cooperation, we
must recognize and prevent the ways in which these famed compromises
further entrenched discrimination. These legacies of exclusion and inequality
continue to negatively impact the opportunities and quality of life for many
people today.

[https://perma.cc/Q89J-N27X] (“April 9th, 1865, was the end of the Civil War for
General Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia.”).
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